This paper presents new evidence from the NLSY on the importance of meritocracy in American society. In it, we find that general intelligence, or "g"--a measure of cognitive ability--is dominant in explaining test score variance. The weights assigned to tests by "g" are similar for all major demographic groups. These results support Spearman's theory of "g."
Not much should be made of the fact that "g" explains a majority of the variance in the test scores. The classical theory of "g" is an artifact of linear correlation analysis. Using a result established by Suppes and Zanotti (1981) , a scalar measure of ability can always be constructed to filly explain the variance in a battery of test scores. This is a theorem in mathematics and not a statement about behavior. Ironically, Spearman and his successors rob "g" of explanatory power by estimating it using linear methods. The best measure of "g" is in general a nonlinear function of the constituent test scores.
Except for psychometrician, few persons are interested in test scores per se. Instead, interest focuses on the behavior correlated with the tests. The great contribution of Herrnstein and Murray is to relate tests to a wide range of social outcomes: education, occupatioml attainment, crime, unemployment, and participation in welfare. They establish that tests are strongly correlated with these outcomes although other factors are also important.
Herrnstein and Murray argue that the U.S. has become more of a meritocracy in the last generation; that ability plays an increasingly important role in determining social outcomes. They attribute disparities in social performance by gender and race to disparities in ability and they interpret the rising wage return to schooling as a rise in the return to ability. This paper examines the role of tests in explaining wages. We consider whether more than "g" is required to summarize the effects of tests on wages. We also consider whether "g" and other components of ability are priced equally across demographic groups. Central to the theory of meritocracy is the notion that ability is the basis for achievement. If the same measures of ability are priced differently across different demographic groups, something besides the meritocratic principle is at work in producing labor market outcomes.
Our study of the NLSY data reveals that the weighting of the test scores used to produce "g" is of the remarkably similar across demographic groups. "g" explains between 55 and 70 percent total variance in the matrix of correlations of test scores for all groups.
Our evidence on the performance of "g" in predicting wages is much less favorable.
First, several other components of measured ability besides "g" are statistically significant in predicting log wages. Second, measured ability accounts for a small fraction of the variance in log wages. Even after a generous allowance for measurement error in wages, ability, education, and experience combined account for at most one third of the total variance in wages, Third, in a variety of specifications of log wage equations, the economic returns to measured ability differ across demographic groups, contrary to what is predicted by the theory of meritocracy, One reason why abilities may be priced differently across different demographic groups is that there are systematic differences in preferences for employment in different sectors for different groups.
et al., 1996a) by
We examine this possibility below and more extensively elsewhere (Cawley, estimating a model of occupatioml choice that corrects for the self-selection bias that may give rise to different measured prices of skills across reveals that "g" plays an important role both in occupational determination. White collar wages are more strongly correlated with sectors. This estimation selection and in wage "g" than are blue collar wages, but abilities orthogoml to "g" are also important in both sectors. Blue collar wages are affected by more abilities than are white collar wages. Many of the abilities important for explaining blue collar wages are not cognitive in required to successfully predict occupational choice. mture. More abilities than "g" are also
The National Longitudiml Survey of Youth (NNY) is designed to represent the entire population of American youth and consists of a randomly chosen sample of6,111 U.S. civilian youths, a supplemental sample of 5,295 randomly chosen minority and economically disadvantaged civilian youths, and a sample of 1,280 youths on active duty in the military, All youths were between thirteen and twenty years of age in 1978 and were interviewed annually starting in 1979. The data include equal numbers of males and females. Roughly 16% of respondents are Hispanic and 25% are black. For our analysis, we restrict the sample to those not currently enrolled in school and those persons receiving an hourly wage between $.50 and $1000 in 1990 dollars (all results of this paper are reported in 1990 dollars). This paper uses the NNY weights for each year to produce a natiomlly representative sample. However, our sample is not nationally representative in age; we ordy observe an eight year range of ages in any given year, and the oldest person in our 1993 sample is ordy 36.
In 1980, NLSY respondents were administered a battery often intelligence tests referred to as the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. We describe the ASVAB subtests in Appendix 1 and provide summary statistics in Appendix 2. Appendix 3 presents the ingredients required to construct the model of occupatioml choice discussed in Section 3.
Principal Component Analysis
The first issue we consider is the appropriate measure of intelligence to use for predicting wages. Herrnstein and Murray (1994) argue that there is only one significant intelligence factor, called general intelligence or "g. " They fail to mention that many psychometrician who endorse the theory of general intelligence also maintain that there exist other factors of intelligence which have less explamtory power than "g" but are nonetheless both statistically and numerically significant in describing outcomes. For example, Spearman (1927) incorporates specific factors "s" which complement general intelligence "g. " Cattell (1987) describes two forms of general intelligence: "fluid" , which is applied to all tasks, and "crystallized" which is a combination of fluid intelligence and practice or study of a specific task. Carroll (1993) posits a~ee-stratum theory of intelligence in which cognitive abilities range from the narrow to the highly general. By omitting mention of specific and narrow cognitive abilities, Herrnstein and Murray give the misleading impression that intelligence can be fully described by "g."
In this paper, "g" is measured by the product of the test score vector and the eigenvector associated with the largest eigenvalue of the matrix of correlations among standardized ASVAB scores. It is well known that the score on "ability" tests rises with the age and the education of the test taker, This by itself indicates that the tests measure knowledge and not some abstract ability that is independent of specific knowledge. To account for this finding, we present six sets of results, each associated with a different measure of cognitive ability. We construct these measures of "g" by estimating principal components from the matrices of correlations of:
(1) (2) (3), (5) (6) umdjusted test scores; test scores adjusted for age (as in Herrnstein and Murray). (4) two adjustments of test scores for age, race, and gender. test scores adjusted for age and education at the time of the ASVAB test, race, and gender. test scores adjusted for age and education at the time of the ASVAB test, and the highest grade of education achieved by both parents, race and gender.
By "adjusted," we mean that each of the ten ASVA.B tests was regressed on the appropriate combimtion of age, education, and parents' education, separately by race and gender, and principal components were estimated for the residuals. For measure (2), ASVB scores were ordy standardized by age. Urdike the other methods, the standardization does not assume or impose a 1inear relationship between age and measured ability.
In our sample, the correlation between AFQT score and education at age 23 is ,6. Our measures of "g" that are residualized on education produce lower-bound estimates of the importance of cognitive ability; our method attributes all overlap of ability with education to education, Likewise, all overlap of ASVAB scores with parents' education is attributed to the latter in one of our measures of "g. "
We use principal components to estimate "g" but principal factor analysis and hierarchical factor amlysis produce essentially the same results. The principal components method is the least affected by sampling error (Jensen, 1987) , but Ree and Earles (1991) find that the correlation between each pair of the three estimates of "g" is .996. However, no matter which method is used, "g" is only as good a measure of cognitive ability as its constituent tests. Many features of personality and motivation are not captured by the ASVAB. of the four subtests that constitute AFQT by an equal amount and assign zero weights to all other subtests. We do not find such a pattern in the weights of any of our six versions of the first principal component. For example, Table 1 lists the ASVAB weights for the first principal component which is standardized by age, race, and gender; these weights suggest that while AFQT is highly correlated with "g" @ = O.829), it is a suboptimal measure of general intelligence, which suggests that Hermstein and Murray underestimate the effect of intelligence 6 on social outcomes. (Jensen, 1987) . These loadings are similar to those produced if principal components are computed for the sample as a whole rather than separately for each race and gender group. Speeded tests (Numerical Operations weight, while the achievement tests that constitute AFQT are and Coding Speed) heavily weighted.
receive little For all groups except black females, the second principal component heavily weights the speeded subtests. Carroll (1993) describes this commordy-found speeded intelligence factor as "Numerical Facility. " The specification of g is robust to the removal of subtests from the matrix; six subtests must be removed before the Numerical Facility factor becomes the first principal component. Beyond the second factor there are few similarities in the principal components across race and gender groups. Table 2 indicates that component, is dominant in the ASVAJ3 test score matrix--it explains between 55.2 % and 70.6% of the variation in the test scores of each race-gender group.3 Ordy for white men and women does the Numerical Facility factor explain more than 10% of the variance in test scores (11.4% and 10.8% respectively). In each racial group "g" has more ' me amount of variance explained by g depends upon the sirnifari~of the tests and the Age of ability of the persons constituting tie sample. Jensen (1987) reporLs that across 20 independent correlation matrices comprising a totaf of more than 70 tests, the average percentage of variance accounted for by g is 42.7% (wids a range of 33.4% to 61.4%). The dominance of the first factor in explaining variance in the test correlation matrix should not be interpreted as convincing evidence in favor of a single factor called intelligence. Suppes and Zanotti (1981) have shown that it is possible to construct a scalar latent factor from a vector of test scores such that conditional on the factor, test scores are statistically independent. If D = (dl,..., d~) is a vector of T binary random variables with density f(D),then there always exists a factor g such that
so that "g" plays the role of a single factor in conventioml factor analysis; that is, conditional on "g, " test scores are independent. Standard probability arguments can be used to extend their theorem to countable-valued random variables (e.g. success proportions on exams), and hence to approximate continuous variables arbitrarily well (see, e.g. Holland and Rosenbaum, 1986) .
"g" exists for any vector of finite-valued random variables; it is not a result derived from the nature of intelligence. The key test for a theory of single intelligence is not how well "g" explains performance on the intelligence tests from which it is derived, but how well it predicts social outcomes. This is the subject of the next two sections.
Wages and Ability
Hermstein and Murray note that large residuals are common in wage regressions, and speculate: 8 "What then is this [wage] residual, this X factor, that increasingly commands a wage premium-over and above education? It could be a variety of factors . . . but readers will not be surprised to learn that we believe that it includes cognitive ability."4 They perform no empirical analysis of wages but cite a study of the NNY by Blackbum and Neumark (1993) which concludes that the rise in the return to education is concentrated among the smartest workers. Elsewhere (Cawley et al., 1996b) , we test and refine the conclusions of
Blackbum and
If this, Neumark, and the assumption of general intelligence, are correct, then the coefficient for "g" in wage regressions should be numerically important and statistically significant. Previous research (Ree and Earles, 1991; Ree, Earles, and Teachout, 1994) has concluded that "g" is "dominant" in explaining job performance. Domimnce in this context means that the contribution to R2 of additional test score components is "small" relative to that of "g. " Close examination of this work reveals that the additional components are statistically significant and that "g" explains much less than half of the variance in the outcomes studied (supervisor ratings and success in military occupatioml training schools).
This section examines the relationship between the ability and wages in our sample. We estimate the following model of wages:
Wit =~ai + TXi~+ 7, + sit
where Wi~is the log of hourly wages for person i in year t, ai is measured ability, which may 4 Herrnstein and Murray, 1994, p, 97 9 be a scalar or a vector, Xit is a set of "human capital" measures, and~, is an intercept term for year t.s &ilis the error term for individual i in year t, and Ei is the covariance matrix of the error terms across time for individual i. &i [and &j[, are statistically independent for all i # j. We specify the human capital variables to include schooling (measured as grades completed), schooling squared (to allow for diminishing returns to education), weeks of tenure in the current job, tenure squared, labor market experience (defined by Mincer (1974) as age minus schooling minus 6) and experience squared.
The series of tables labelled "3" contain the coefficient estimates of our wage model using as ability measures our six versions of the ten principal components of the ASVAB test for each race-gender group.
of each table, we decisively All ability measures are We fit separate regressions Using F tests, the statistics from which are reported at the bottom reject the null hypothesis that the wage returns to ability are equal across ability which race and gender groups. We reject this hypothesis for all six measures of cognitive and both versions of the regression. Especially relevant are Tables 3RA and 3RB, for the principal components are standardized only by year of birth; these indicate that an 5We test our assumption of linear returns to abili~using a generalized additive model and super smoother for transforming the regressors. (See Vembles and Ripley, p. 250) . Given sepasabili~of the regression model and the scoring method of abili~, the optimaf nordinear transformation of ability with the closest tit to log wages appears to be linear except at the extremes (which applies to few people).
A assumption of linear returns to cognitive abifity is justiled.~is finding that the effects of ability are robust to monotonic transformation is useful for studies of value-added measures in education (e.g. teacher salaries with incentives based on students' exam performance). (See Cawley, Heclrmao and Meyer, 19%) . equal gain in cognitive ability is rewarded in significantly different ways across race and gender in the labor market. In general, females earn a higher return to "g. " Our stacked regression model is motivated by the failure to reject in a joint F-test the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal across years. Because of the panel mture of the data, the error term is correlated across time for individuals. We correct for this by using EickerWhite standard errors generalized for panel data. Because we restrict analysis to individuals who are out of school and employed, each individual is not necessarily in our sample for all fifteen years; the panel is unbalanced.b
The results in Tables 3 support the theory of multiple strata of intelligence, with "g" dominant in explaining social outcomes.7 In each case, the fust principal component, "g", is statistically significant and positive for all race-gender groups. s The coefficient of "g" is almost always larger than that of any other principal component, but the gap depends on how much the test scores have been adjusted. The gap is largest for the principal components associated with unadjusted test scores (Table 3QA and Table 3QB ) and is smallest for the principal components associated with the most highly -residualtied test scores (Table 30A and Table 30B ), where the 'The amlysis of this paper focuses on out-of-school workers, because even persons of high cognitive ability are often forced to take low-paying jobs while enrolled. To include such persons irr our sample would cause downward bias in abifity coefflcien~. Unemployed workers are also excluded fmm the sample, since their wage is not observed.
.8% of all pemon-year observations arc excluded due to unemployment, and 24.7 % are excluded because of school enrollment. This does not affect our estimates as long as the population of interest is employed, out-of-school workers. However, if the population of interest includes tie unemployed and students then it is necessary to correct for self-selwtion into the sample. We use a muldnomiaf pmbit selection model to correct for this bias using Lee's (1983) generalization of the Heckman two step method, and fmd that these correcti rcsuIcs are sirnifar to our reported results.
'The signs of the coefficients of the second through tenti principaf components are irrelevant because each principal component can be reconstructed using the negative of i~ASVAB weighfi to explain an equal amount of ASVAB variance. This reconshucted principal component would have a coefficient of equal magnitude, but opposite sign. The coefficient of the first principal component is meaningful because it has positive weighk on afl ASVAB subtests; a negative coefficient unequivocally means that less intelligent workers earn more.
ecause our sample sizes are large, we use a significance level of 0.01 throughout the paper. It should be noted, however, that the power of sigtilcance tests is not equal across demographic groups since the group sizes are unequaf. Rather than arbitrarily equalizing the power of our tests, which would lead to equal incidence of type fl errors but unequal incidence of Type I error across groups, we present p values in tables to petit readers to draw their own conclusions.
coefficient of the third principal component exceeds that of "g" for hispanic males. The results in the Table 3 series conflict with the model of cognitive determinism implicit in Herrnstein and Murray. The highest R2 from these regressions is .2852, for black females (goodness of fit is higher for women than men in each racial group). Even accounting for measurement error using the estimates of Bound (1993), ability, education, experience, and job tenure account for less than a third of wage variation.
The structure of wage residuals cotilrms that a single form of cognitive ability is driving wage outcomes. Principal components were estimated for the wage residuals formed from a regression of log wages on the background model (time dummies and human capital measures).
The results, in ordy the "g" standardized by collar. White collar workers "Professional, Technical, and in sectors described by the U. S. Census as "Non-Farm Managers and Administrators," "Sales Workers," and "Clerical and Unskilled Workers, " The last group encompasses only white-collar unskilled workers, such as cashiers, file clerks, bill collectors, and messengers.
We simultaneously estimate choice of occupation and Following Cameron and Heckman (1992, revised; 1996) , we where 1 is the indicator fiction that sets it = 1 if the statement inside the argument is true and is zero otherwise. We assume that (et, q [t,rIOJare independent across persons and are independent within persons conditional on f. f is assumed to be statistically independent of (vt,~L, UIJ. We further assume that
and we normalize variance of v~= 1; and define the varimce of ul~= a: while the variance of W,= 0;. Y, is the difference in expected lifetime utility from being in a white collar occupation versus being in a blue collar occupation at date t, and W1,-WO,, is the difference in the potential log wages in the white collar versus blue collar sector at date t. In our case, t=l,. ...15 and the indicator variable i, equals one if Y, >0, in which case the individual selects into a white collar occupation at date t, and equals zero otherwise. The event it = 1 thus corresponds to choice of occupation 1 while the event it = O corresponds to choice of occupation O.
Instead of assuming joint normality of e, and q~,,,q,,,, we estimate a nonp~ame~ic factor structure model to account for the correlation in factor loadings and~is an unobserved factor unobserved ability, for example, or motivation. In an individual wages over time. p and a are that does not vary over time; it might be this model,~is the sole source of dependence between emor terms at a point in time and the sole source of dependence for a given error term 14 over time.9 We do not know the distribution of the unobserved factor~but we can consistently estimate the distribution using a discrete approximation (see Heckrnan and Singer, 1984 and Cameron and Heckman, 1987) . In this paper, we find that a discrete approximation (f= f, or f = f,) fits the data well. We estimate the probability of each value off, P(f = f,) = P,, P(f = f,)
= Pz = 1-PI as well as the values of f. The fitted model is thus a binomial discrete factor model.
Details on constructing the likelihood are given in Appendix 3. The basic approach goes back to Heckman and Singer (1984) and Cameron and Heckman (1987 and national unemployment rates, and indicator variables for the year and region Table 6 contains estimated occupational choice coefficients from a model in which wages and occupational choices are determined simultaneously. The parameters corresponds to the net gain equation. These coefficients represent preferences by the worker for a specific sector of employment. Table 6 indicates that while "g" has a substantial effect on occupational choice, other characteristics are also important. The difference in log wages between the two sectors has a statistically-significant correlation with choice of occupation, as does education. Moreover, "g"
is not the only important factor in wages; the second principal component is statistically Weckman (1981) intiuced factor suucture models for simple computation of discrete choice and censored data models.
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significant for all groups. Table 7 contains the coefficients in the blue collar wage regression simultaneously estimated with the model for occupational choice; the table indicates that "g" is not dominant in explaining wage differences across blue collar workers. Many other factors besides "g" are statistically significant. For four of the six race-gender groups, the return to a standard deviation of "g" is less than that accorded an extra year of education. For all groups, the wage effects of region of residence can offset the wage effect of an extra standard deviation of "g." For five of the six race/gender groups, the wage effects of local or gain from an extra standard deviation of "g." Table 8 contains the coefficients in the white national unemployment offset the wage collar wage regression simultaneously estimated with the model for occupational choice. In contrast to the blue collar wage regression, for this group "g" has the largest correlation with wages of any principal component; this means that white collar occupations are more "g" loaded. Fewer ability components are statistically significant than is the case for blue collar wages. Once again, the returns to cognitive ability seem small in relation to that of other variables. The return to a standard deviation of "g" is rivalled by that to two years of education, and can be offset by region of residence and local unemployment rates.
The coefficient on schooling is significantly larger in the white collar sector than the blue collar sector for each race-gender group. This is consistent with the finding of Keane and Wolpin (1994) who use simulation and interpolation to solve a discrete-choice dynamic programming problem of schooling and occupational choice for NLSY males 1979-88, and find that schooling increased white collar skill 7°/0 and blue collar skill 2.4°/0.
The overall results indicate that the correlations of "g" with occupational choice and wages within sectors are generally statistically significant but modest in magnitude. The effects of a few years of education, the sector of parent's employment, and region of residence combined with the local unemployment rate rival or exceed the coefficient of "g" in magnitude.
Conclusion
Our results are consistent with the theory of general intelligence:
of the variance in test scores and "g" is remarkably similar across race "g" explains a majority and gender. However, our results conflict with the predictions of Herrnstein and Murray; the correlations of "g" with wages and occupational choice are modest compared to those of education, family background, and region of residence. We also find that the returns to "g" differ significantly across race and gender; payment is not made for "ability" alone. Judged by contribution to R-squared in a regression of wages on ability, education, and work experience, none of our six measures of "g" is preferable to any other. White collar wages are more highly loaded on "g" than are blue collar wages. Ability factors other than "g" are economically useful in both sectors. More than "g" drives occupational choice. In explains little of the variance in Local Unemployment Rate Dummies Constructed Using: R4420300 R4009200 R3658700 R3403300 R3076600 R2872900 R2447100 R2259600 R1892500 R1521800 R1146600 R0898100 R0646800 R0393540 R0216000 Occupation R41821OO R3727800 R3522800 R31271OO R2924400 R2525400 R231 7600 R1 922800 R1650200 R1255400 R0945000 R0702100 R0446400 R0263400 RO046400
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Appendix 3: The Sample Likelihood For The Model of Occupational Choice
We impose the exclusion restriction that region of residence and local and national unemployment rates are included in X[ but not in Z1. Those variables are assumed to affect wages but not preferences; such exclusion restrictions augmented with additional full support conditions permit nonparameteric identification of the model given the one factor structure. We assume that v~and u, are normally distributed, but allow the distribution of~to be arbitrary, subject to regulari~conditions. We find that a two point distribution for~is adequate to fit the data.
The likelihood function is formed assuming independent sampling across persons, Assuming that the support of common factor f is discrete, contribution to likelihood S of a person is:
The conditional density of wages in occupation "O" is:
The conditioml density of wages in occupation "1" is:
The conditiomd probability that occupation 1 selected is:
where u: = 1 and where we denote the standard normal distribution by @ and the standard normal density by @. We estimate the distribution of j nonparametrically with a ftite mixing distribution, estimating Pj and \ along with the remaining parameters of the model. View publication stats View publication stats
